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Responsible Parents and Good Children
Judith T. Younger*
Introduction
In Genesis, God commands Abraham to sacrifice his beloved
son, Isaac.1 God puts Abraham to this "test" for no apparent reason
and even though Isaac has done no wrong. Abraham goes through
all the "murderous motions,"2 asking no questions, making no pro-
test, perfectly willing, it seems, to obey God's command. Isaac soon
discovers that he is the sacrifice but nevertheless advances the pro-
ceedings by offering no resistance. The message is clear and horri-
ble: the innocent child is in mortal danger from his parent and his
God, both of whom are supposed to love him. The Genesis story has
a happy ending when God orders Abraham not to raise his hand
against Isaac or do anything to him. Yet, there is a persistent tradi-
tion that Abraham did do some harm to Isaac as he lay bound on
the altar.3 Whichever version we accept, the most amazing thing
about the story is that none of its three protagonists seems to con-
sider it morally wrong for God to ask Abraham, and for Abraham to
agree, to murder his son. The story may be descriptive of parent-
* Joseph E. Wargo, Anoka County Bar Association, Professor of Family Law,
University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Genesis 22:1-18.
2. The phrase is from JACK MILEs, GOD 59 (1995).
S. Su&izm SpwG L, Tins LAST TuAL xii-xiv (1967). Wilfred Owen best describes
this version in his poem:
So Abram rose, and clave the wood,
and went, And took the fire with him, and a knife.
And as they sojourned both of them together,
Isaac the first-born spake and said, My Father,
Behold the preparations, fire and iron,
But where the lamb for this burnt-offering?
Then Abram bound the youth with belts and straps,
And builded parapets and trenches there,
And stretched forth the knife to slay his son.
When lo! an angel called him out of heaven,
Saying, Lay not thy hand upon the lad,
Neither do anything to him thy son.
Behold! Caught in a thicket by its horns. A Ram.
Offer the Ram of Pride instead.
But the old man would not so, but slew his son,
And half the seed of Europe, one by one.
Wilfred Owen, The Parable of the Old Man and the Young, in WLFRED OWEN: THE
COMPLETE POEMS & FRAGMENTS 174 (John Stallworthy ed., 1983).
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child relations at the time it was written4 and is prophetic about
the future. Indeed, the history of childhood has been a "nightmare"
in which children have been "killed, abandoned, beaten, terrorized,
and sexually abused."5 This is so in whatever place and time we
pick and despite the fact that adults have always found children
useful to further adult aims-for example, for "acquiring and per-
petuating family property,"6 as "political hostages, security for
debts,"7 "negotiable assets,"8 and "for the services they could pro-
vide," including care of aging parents. 9
In America today, we are obsessed with children.' 0 We debate
the best methods of raising them, worry about their physical,
moral, and sexual problems, and struggle to teach and amuse them
in an elaborate system of schools and playgrounds built for those
purposes." Experts in psychology, psychiatry, and pediatrics study
children and bombard parents with their findings. 12 Yet, we do not
seem to have awakened completely from the nightmare. Children
4. SPIEGEL, supra note 3, at 8-12; Lloyd deMause, The Evolution of Childhood,
in HISToRY OF CHILDHOOD 1, 51 (Lloyd deMause ed., 1974). The story of Abraham
cannot be treated as strictly historical but it certainly has "genuine contemporary
colour." 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 93 (1969) (discussing the book of Genesis); see
also JoHN VAN SEmas, ABBAHAm IN HISTORy AND TRADITION 65-103 (1975); cf
Psalms 27:10 ("When my father and my mother forsake me, then the Lord will take
me up.... ."). In any event, child sacrifice and infanticide were widely practiced in
the ancient world for the purpose of propitiating the gods and other reasons. BAR-
BARA K GREENLEAF, CHILDREN THOUGH THE AGES: A HISTORY OF CHILDHOOD 17-19
(1978).
5. DeMause, supra note 4, at 1. Many sources provide us with this information:
official biographies of the famous, historical sociologists, literary historians, social
historians, and psychoanalysts. Id. at 4. Those writing about the subject seem to
have rejected a linear or evolutionary model of cultural development for one of cul-
tural uniqueness centered around in-depth case studies. See, e.g., DAVID HUNT, PAR-
ENTS AND CHILDREN IN HIsTORY 6 (1970) (discussing France from 1550-1700);
PHrLIPE ARiMs, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962) (Robert Baldick trans., 2d. ed.
1970) (discussing France in the 15th-18th centuries); cf GREENLEAF, supra note 4.
6. Using children to acquire and pass property is accomplished through "care-
fully arranged marriages" and adoptions. GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 24.
7. Id.
8. Children, as negotiable assets, "could be sold into slavery for a father's
profit." Id. at 24-25. Greenleaf describes the sale of children into slavery for profit
as a practice of the Babylonians. Id.
9. Id. at 25; see MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN's
RIGHTS 46 (1994); see also W.FI LACEY, THE FAmY IN CLASSICAL GREECE 117 (1968).
10. See, e.g., What Grown-Ups Don't Understand: A Special Issue on Childhood
in America, N.Y. Tms, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine).
11. Id.; see also commission reports, infra note 13; Sonia L. Nazario, Education:
Schoolteachers Say It's Wrongheaded to Try to Teach Students What's Right, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 8, 1992 at BI; Terri Hamlin, Skepticism a Sad Shield for a Teacher Edu-
cation, L.A. Timws, Aug. 30, 1992, at B2; John Leo, Sex and Schools, TIE, Nov. 24,
1986, at 54.
12. See, e.g., DR. BENJAMIN SPOICK, BABY AND CHILD CARE (1946). The book was a
best-seller, and was first published in 1946. Id. There were subsequent revisions of
Baby and Child Care, more than 200 printings, and sales of more than 20,000,000
490 [Vol. 14:489
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are still in danger-increasingly at risk from poverty, suicide,
drugs, sex, dropping out of school, and family violence 1 3 Children
are victims of violence-indeed, "any juvenile between ages 12 and
17 is more likely to be the victim of violent crime than persons past
their mid twenties."14 Children are perpetrators of violence as well.
For example, in 1992, "juveniles accounted for 13% of all violent
crimes reported to law enforcement agencies and 18% of all violent
crime arrests."15 Experts blame these ills on parents and their fail-
ure to form and maintain strong, stable families in which their chil-
dren can grow up.'6 As the National Commission on Children
stated:
[Alt every age, among all races and income groups, and in com-
munities nationwide, many children are in jeopardy. They
grow up in families whose lives are in turmoil. Their parents
are too stressed and too drained to provide the nurturing, struc-
ture, and security that protect children and prepare them for
adulthood. Some of these children are unloved and ill tended.
Others are unsafe at home and in their neighborhoods. Many
are poor, and some are homeless and hungry. Often they lack
the rudiments of basic health care and a quality education....
... The conditions of children's lives and their future
prospects largely reflect the well-being of their families. When
families are strong, stable, and loving, children have a sound
basis for becoming caring and competent adults. When families
are unable to give children the affection and attention they
need and to provide for their material needs, children are far
less likely to achieve their full potential. 17
copies. Michael Zuckerman, Dr. Spock: The Confidence Man, in THE FAMILY IN His-
TORY 179, 183-84 (Charles Rosenberg ed., 1975).
13. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHIIDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN
AGENDA FOR CHIMREN AND FAIius vii-viii, 33-37 (1991) [hereinafter COMMISSION
REPORT]. Other prestigious commissions agree. See, e.g., CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON AD-
OLESCENT DEVELOPMENT, TURNING PoINrs: PREPARING AMERICAN YOUTH FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (1989); NATIONAL COMMISSION TO PREVENT INFANT MORTALITY, TROUB-
LING TRENDS: THE HEALTH OF AMERICA'S NEXT GENERATION (1990); PRESIDENTIAL
WOR CNG GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF CHILDREN AND THEmR FAMILIES,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR
LEGAL ACTION (1993). See also Peter Applebome, Study Says Society Fails 19 Mil-
lion Youths, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1995, at A8. David S. Broder, Nation Reflects Dam-
age to Family, STAR TRm. (Minneapolis), Mar. 25, 1993, at A18.
14. HowARD M. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND Vic-
Tnis: A FOCus ON VIOLENCE 14 (1995).
15. Id. at 3; see also FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME RE.
PORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 279 (1992) [hereinafter F.B.I.]; John J. Wil-
son & James C. Howell, Serious and Violent Juvenile Crime: A Comprehensive
Strategy, Juv. & FIm. CT. J., Fall 1994, at 3.
16. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 251-55.
17. Id. at xvii, xxix (executive summary).
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The thesis of this article is that the law bears some responsibility
for this parental failure and for the corresponding plight of chil-
dren. Ideally, the law should act as teacher,18 clearly articulating
societal expectations that parents will be responsible, and that chil-
dren will be good, and encouraging and rewarding such behavior.
Actually, the law entrusts parents with the entire child-raising task
but articulates only three clear expectations: (1) parents are to pro-
vide financial support for their children;J9 (2) parents are to send
their children to school;20 (3) parents are to refrain from neglecting
or abusing their children or risk state interference in their fami-
lies.21 Beyond these unexceptionable messages the law is ambiva-
lent.2 2 On each of five important issues, namely family form and
function, 23 the economic value of children,24 parents' responsibility
for the antisocial acts of their children,25 and the primacy of chil-
dren's interests in deciding issues that affect their welfare,26 the
law seems unable to choose between two opposite positions.27 The
law reflects both and, thus, fails as a teacher. This article begins
1S. As one of my great teachers put it.
In ancient days, there was a vision that appeared almost simulta-
neously to the best minds of the Hellenic and Hebraic worlds. Great
sages voiced the hope that the law could serve as a pedagogue to the
people, instructing them in the maxims of enlightment, righteousness,
and self-rule. No less than the Psalmist in the Bible, Plato and Aris-
totle believed that the law should be employed as "a lamp unto the feet
and a light unto the path."
EDMOND CAHN, THE MORAL DECisiON 5 (1955).
19. See IRA M. ELLMAN ET AL., FAmY LAw 355 (1991).
20. MASON, supra note 9, at 86. Parents are required to send their children to
school by compulsory school attendance laws. Id. Some states permit parents to
teach their children at home in accordance with state prescribed requirements. See
EL.MAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 1063.
21. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); see ELLMAN ET
AL., supra note 19, at 1121-27.
22. In this way, it reflects the ambivalent nature of the family as an institution
and the ambivalent nature of parental attitudes to children. The family can be
heaven or hell for its members, a potential perpetrator of great good or great evil.
Parental attitudes to children are similarly mixed: children are "loved and hated,
rewarded and punished, bad and loving all at once." DeMause, supra note 4, at 8.
23. See infra part II.
24. See infra part III.
25. See infra part IV.
26. See infra part V.
27. The two opposite positions on each of these important issues are:
Family form: family form matters; family form does not matter.
Family function: the biological family is best regardless of function; the functioning
family is best regardless of biology.
The economic value of children: children are a valuable commodity and this should
be frankly acknowledged; children are not a commodity and the law should
prohibit commerce in them.
Parental responsibility for the antisocial acts of their children: parents are responsi-
ble for these acts; parents are not responsible for these acts.
[Vol. 14:489492
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with a selective overview of the law's treatment of the family from
colonial times to the present, criticizes its current ambivalence on
family matters, and proposes reforms.
I. The Family From Colonial Times to the Present
The European nations that settled America brought with
them two legal systems-the common law, which prevailed in Eng-
land, and the civil law, which prevailed on the continent.28 Both
were founded on the Christian ideal of marriage. Thus, neither was
ambivalent about family matters. Marriage was the exclusive sanc-
tioned form of cohabitation: a divine, monogamous, lifelong institu-
tion designed to produce and nurture children.29 Accordingly,
ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over marriage, 30 a religious
The primacy of children's interests in deciding issues that affect their welfare: chil-
dren's interests should be paramount; children's interests should be
subordinate to those of parents and the state.
28. Wigmore included both in his list of the world's 16 legal systems; he called
the former "Anglican" and the latter "Romanesque." 3 JOHN WIGMoRE, A PANORAMA
OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS 981, 1054 (1928). "Civil," as used here, does not
mean "Roman," but rather, the then prevailing law of France and Spain which Wig-
more called "Romanesque." This "civil" law was a composite of Roman and Germanic
law. Id. at 1037. American community property systems are primarily Spanish.
French law was displaced by the Spanish system or by the English common law.
WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL S. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNrIY PROPERTY
§ 37 at 55 (2d ed. 1971). In any event, the differences between the French and Span-
ish systems were not significant. Picotte v. Cooley, 10 Mo. 312, 318 (1847).
29. On marriage as the only permissible form of cohabitation, see I Corinthians
7:1, 9 (One should marry to avoid fornication; "[i]t is better to marry than to burn.")
On the divine and therefore life-long, indissoluble nature of the bond, see Mark 10:9
(man cannot break a bond of marriage created by God); Matthew 19:5-6 (man and
wife become one when married). On monogamy, see Matthew 19:5 (man is joined to
one wife); 1 Corinthians 7:2 (each man must have his own wife, and each woman, her
own husband). On the function and organization of the family, see Genesis 1:28
(duty to multiply and raise children); I Timothy 2:15 (woman must bear children to
be saved spiritually); Genesis 3:16 (wife must obey husband); 1 Corinthians 7:3 (mu-
tual duty to render spouse his or her conjugal rights). But see 2 GEORGE E. HowARD,
A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INsTrrUTMONS 19-23 (1904) (noting inconsistencies in the
Biblical views on the availability of divorce). The canon law that grew from these
Biblical precepts became the dominant force governing marriage and divorce in Eng-
land and other European countries. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMES-
TIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 406-07 (2d ed. 1988).
The conception of marriage as an indissoluble bond was an important influence
in both England and Spain. 2 HOwARD, supra, at 30. Even after the Reformation in
England in 1534, the Anglican Church maintained a strict divorce policy designed to
preserve the indissoluble character of marriage. Id. By 1603 the Church prohibited
all divorce. Id. Catholic Spain and other civil law countries followed the doctrines of
the Catholic Church and treated marriage as a sacrament creating an indissoluble
bond. This was reflected in the early Spanish Code. DE FuNIAK & VAUGHN, supra
note 28, § 219, at 502 n.69 (citing LAs SI:TE PARTmAS pt. IV, tits. IX & X (1263)).
30. By the middle of the twelfth century in England, the ecclesiastical courts
claimed exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and its incidents. See Franklyn C. Se-
taro, A History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U. L. REv. 102, 119-21 (1938),
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ceremony was required to enter it,31 divorce was not generally
available to dissolve it,32 criminal penalties were imposed for con-
duct that threatened it,33 and spouses were assigned sex-based
roles within it reflecting the husband's superior status and the fam-
ily's expected function.34
and sources cited therein. These courts passed this jurisdiction to the Anglican
Church in 1534. Id. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction was maintained until the Matrimo-
nial Causes Act was passed in 1857. Id.
After the repeal of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, France became a purely Catholic
state once again. MAX RnENsTEIN, MARRIAGE STABIrrY, DIVORCV, AND THE LAw 26,
194-201 (1972). As a result, except for a few civil statutes requiring registration, the
church completely governed marriage. Id. The church retained its dominance until
the French Revolution in 1789. Id. at 194-95. At that time the concept of individual
liberty encouraged the secularization of marriage for a portion of the community. Id.
In Spain, the Catholic Church took jurisdiction over marriage from the civil au-
thorities between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See CHARLES E. CHAP-
MAN, A HISTORY OF SPAIN 143-44 (1918).
31. At the Council of Trent in 1563, the Church of England formally adopted the
position that marriages would not be valid unless contracted in the presence of a
priest and two witnesses. 1 HowARD, supra note 29, at 315-16. A religious ceremony
was required for a valid marriage in Spain. See DE FUNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note
28, § 55.1, at 95. In England, however, the necessity of a religious ceremony was not
accepted, and informal marriages were apparently valid until the passage of Lord
Hardwicke's Act in 1753. 1 HowARD, supra note 29, at 435-60. This was true
notwithstanding the opinions of several judges in Regina v. Millis, 8 Eng. Rep. 844
(Ire. 1843), asserting that a marriage without ceremony was never recognized in
England.
32. For a history of divorce in England, see 2 HowARD, supra note 29, at 109-17;
RHEINsTEmN, supra note 30, at 24 ("From the late seventeenth century on, parliamen-
tary divorce developed into a regular practice. But the proceedings were so cumber-
some and expensive that they were available only to the most affluent. The number
of parliamentary divorces thus remained low, one to three a year."). Legal divorce
came to France in 1792, although many did not wait for it. Id. at 201. There was no
absolute divorce in Spain. DE FUNiAK & VAUGHN, supra note 28, § 219, at 501-02.
33. As to the civil law, see LAS SiETE PARTIDAS, supra note 29, pt. VII, tit. VIII,
law VIII (abortion), tit. XVII, laws I-XV (adultery), tit. XVII, law XVI (bigamy), tit.
XVIII, laws I-III (incest), tit. XIX, laws I-II (seduction), tit. XXI, laws I-II (sodomy),
tit. XXII, laws I-II (procuring); CARL L. VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRDM-
NAL LAw 286-87 (1916) (adultery, bigamy, crimes against nature, pandering, and
incest). As to the common law, see 1 WILLAM HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 619 (adultery, procuration, incest), 620 (unnatural offenses, bigamy) (1966); 4
HoLDSwoRm, supra, at 504 (sodomy, bigamy).
34. Married women were subordinate to their husbands under English common
law. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 405-14 (2d ed. 1898) (criticizing reliance on Biblical concepts as justification but
nevertheless characterizing the husband's role as the wife's "guardian"); 1 AMERICAN
LAw OF PROPERTY 760-62 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (noting that decisions by royal
judges in this area hardened early notions of male protectiveness inherited from the
Germanic Law).
Spanish civil law also recognized the dominance of the husband in the family
unit and supported his position by designating him head of the houlsehold and grant-
ing him authority over major family decisions. DE FuNIAK & VAUGHN, supra note 28,
at 328 (citing G. SCHM1DT, CwI LAw OF SPAIN AND MEXICO 11 (1851)).
494 [Vol. 14:489
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In America there were no ecclesiastical courts and few clergy-
men; marriage thus became a matter for secular regulation.35
Early American laws authorized marriage by civil ceremony,36 di-
vorce on the basis of fault,37 and alimony awards to innocent, needy
wives. 38 Monogamy39 remained the only legal form of marriage,
and spouses retained their assigned, sex-based roles.40 The mar-
ried father was the preeminent family member under the colonies'
version of English common law.41 The spouses were one and the
one was the husband.42 He was the only legal personality in the
35. See 2 HOWARD, supra note 29, at 121-327 (discussing civil marriage in the
New England colonies, the Southern colonies and the Middle colonies).
36. At first, the New England colonies required a civil marriage ceremony. 2
HOWARD, supra note 29, at 125-32, 135-40. Eventually, they relaxed their stand and
allowed either a civil or an ecclesiastical ceremony. Id. Civil ceremonies also were
authorized in the middle colonies of Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. Id.
at 267-327. In Louisiana, a statute granted civil authorities the power to solemnize
marriages after 1807. Id. at 419-20.
37. 3 HOWARD, supra note 29, at 3-18, 31-33, 96-101. For a period following the
American Revolution, courts had no jurisdiction to grant divorce as state legislatures
alone possessed this authority. Id. at 4. Even after the courts obtained jurisdiction
over divorce, several state legislatures continued to grant legislative divorces to un-
happy couples who lacked grounds for judicial divorce. NELSON BLAKE, TE ROAD TO
RENO 55-56 (1962) (citing 1832-33 Mo. Acts, chs. xcvii-cix). As divorce grounded on
fault became more widespread, legislative divorce became less attractive. By 1860,
legislative divorce was a dead letter in most American states. 3 HOWARD, supra note
29, at 31-50, 96-101.
38. For alimony awards in common law jurisdictions, see Glover v. Glover, 16
Ala. 440, 445 (1849) (granted in equity); Campbell v. Campbell, 16 S.E. 960, 960-61
(Ga. 1893); Foote v. Foote, 22 ll. 425, 426 (1859); Parker v. Parker, 97 N.E. 988, 989-
90 (Mass. 1912); Sheafe v. Sheafe, 24 N.H. 564, 567-69 (1852). For alimony awards
in community property jurisdictions, see Eidenmuller v. Eidenmuller, 37 Cal. 364,
366 (1869); Madison v. Madison, 1 Wash. Terr. 60, 62 (1859).
39. Marital monogamy withstood at least two early assaults. One came from the
Mormon Church, which supported the institution of polygamy as a religious duty
from 1843 until 1890. The Church abandoned this position in the face of decisions
like Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which upheld as constitutional a
federal anti-bigamy act, and popular prejudice, which threatened Utah's chance for
admission to the Union.
The second assault came from the Shaker sect, which rejected marriage in favor
of celibacy and communal family life. Shaker communities peaked in the late 1800s
and declined in the twentieth century. See generally MARGuERIT MELCHER, THE
SHAKER ADvENTmu (1941).
40. The husband was the financial provider obligated to support the family. For
common law examples, see Neil v. Johnson, 11 Ala. 615, 618 (1847); Shelton v. Pen-
dleton, 18 Conn. 417, 420 (1847); Jones v. Gutman, 41 A. 792, 794 (Md. 1898); Keller
v. Phillips, 39 N.Y. 351, 355 (1868). For community property examples, see Williams
v. Williams, 243 P. 402, 404 (Ariz. 1926); Edminston v. Smith, 92 P. 842, 843-44
(Idaho 1907); Callahan v. Patterson, 4 Tex. 61, 66 (1849). The wife was an economic
dependent obligated to perform domestic services. See, e.g., Smyley v. Reese, 53 Ala.
89, 96 (1875); Brooks v. Brooks, 119 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1941); Mewhirter v. Hatten, 42
Iowa 288 (1875); Coleman v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17 (1883); Frame v. Frame, 36 S.W.2d 152
(Tex. 1931).
41. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 184-85 (1973).
42. Id. at 184.
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family and the virtual owner of its children and their labor43 during
marriage and after divorce.44 The married mother, the unmarried
biological father, and the unmarried biological mother had no rights
to their children.45 Parents of illegitimate children were subject to
criminal penalties for fornication,46 and their children were filius
nullius-children and heirs of no one.4 7 They became charges of
the community, 4 8 as did children whose parents were too poor to
support them.49 However, all children were economic assets in co-
lonial times, providing "a controllable and skilled labor force to the
new country."50 A large number were apprenticed in the home of a
master;53 children raised by their parents worked at home.52 Slave
children were the property of, and served, their masters.53 The pri-
mary unit of social and economic organization during the colonial
period was not the family but was the multipurpose colonial house-
hold.54 As one commentator describes it:
All the important interactions between adults and chil-
dren occurred within this self-contained unit; there, children
were born, raised, schooled in religion, and, as soon as they
were productive, put to useful labor. These children could be
blood relatives or merely be hired help .... Within the hierar-
chy of the household the adult roles relevant to child custody, in
descending order, included: father, master, putative father,
guardian, stepfather, married mother, mistress, widow, step-
mother, unwed mother, and slave mother. Children could be
sons or daughters, apprentices or servants, orphans, bastards,
or slaves.55
Children were expected to be obedient; masters and fathers were
supposed to maintain, train, and control them.56 If these expecta-
tions were not met, community officials could step in and take over
responsibility for the children.57 Clearly, economic needs deter-
43. MASON, supra note 9, at 6-7, 13.
44. Id. at 15 (citing Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586, 586-614 (1976); LINDA
KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 158-83 (1980)).
45. MASON, supra note 9, at 14, 24.
46. Id. at 25 (noting that Massachusetts was the first to pass such a law).
47. Id. at 24.
48. Id. at 25.
49. Id. at 33-34.
50. Id. at 30.
51. Id. The terms of these arrangements were supervised by the courts. Id. at
31.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Id. at 39-40.
54. Id. at 4.
55. Id.
56. Id at 12.
57. Id.
496 [Vol. 14:489
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mined children's custodial arrangements.58 The law supervised
and enforced the work relationship, unconcerned with children's
emotional needs.59
After the colonial period, the law began a shift away from its
emphasis on married fathers' common law rights to a view of chil-
dren with interests of their own60-"the American rule [in custody
disputesi quickly became the 'best-interests-of-the-child.' "61 These
interests became increasingly identified with those of the
mother62-the tender years doctrine, preferring mothers to fathers
in disputes about young children, dates from at least 1813.63 By
the late nineteenth century, illegitimate children were firmly
placed in their mothers' families by state legislation.64 Slavery was
abolished,65 home industry declined,66 indentured servitude for
children was increasingly frowned upon,6 7 and fathers increasingly
left home to find work.68 Home was transformed from family work-
place to retreat from the "competitive world" and bonds of affection
came to dominate economics in family relationships.69
In colonial times, families had cared for children other than
their own but there was no mechanism by which such children
could become legal family members.70 Starting with Massachu-
setts in 1851, all states passed modem adoption statutes.7 1 Under
these statutes, the adoption had to be in the best interests of the
child and approved by a judge.72 During the nineteenth century,
the social and economic status of women improved dramatically.73
"As the factory revolution proceeded, countless thousands of women
58. Id. at 46.
59. Id. at 46-47.
60. Id. at 50, 61.
61. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 492.
62. MASON, supra note 9, at 50, 61.
63. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 502.
64. MASON, supra note 9, at 68.
65. "The [Civil War], the Emancipation Proclamation, and the 13th, 14th, and
15th Amendments ended American slavery and gave the blacks the right to vote."
FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 440.
66. MASON, supra note 9, at 51.
67. Id. at 76-77.
68. Id. at 51.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 73.
71. Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antecedents of American Adoption, FUTURE OF CHILDREN,
Spring 1993, at 17, 22. The American adoption system, unlike the Roman, is sup-
posed to promote the welfare of the adopted children rather than that of the adopting
adults. WALTER WADLINGTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 827
(1995).
72. WADLINGTON, supra note 71, at 827.
73. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 186.
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worked."74 This increased women's stake in society and freed them
from home.75 The divorce rate rose.76 The married women's prop-
erty acts, passed in all the states between 183977 and 187778 "did
not signal a revolution in the status of women" but merely "ratified
and adjusted a silent revolution" which had already occurred.79
At the beginning of the twentieth century, states became more
involved in the family, passing compulsory education laws, laws im-
posing controls on child labor, and laws allowing state intervention
into families in which parents neglected or abused children.80 At
this time, states first began to help poor mothers support their chil-
dren rather than removing them.81 Women finally received the
right to the vote,8 2 enabling them to work effectively for reforms in
family law.8 3 Following Louisiana's lead in the 1930s, state legisla-
tures began to enact so-called parental liability laws making par-
ents vicariously liable for the torts and crimes of their children.84
By this time, a majority of states recognized common law marriage
for which no ceremony, civil or religious, was required.85 Marriage
could thus be purely consensual. Divorce became easier as no fault
divorce grounds replaced or supplemented fault grounds in every
state.86 Courts and legislatures, in the wake of expanding equal
protection doctrine and state equal rights amendments, eliminated
sex-based legal roles in marriage,8 7 and sex-based presumptions in
74. Id. at 434.
75. Id. at 186, 434.
76. Id. at 438.
77. Mississippi was the first state to enact such a statute. Id. at 185-86. For the
current version of this statute, see Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-3-1 (1972).
78. "The last State to fall into line was Virginia, in 1877." JAMES SCHOULER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HUSBAND AND WIFE 254 n.2 (1882).
79. FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 186.
80. MASON, supra note 9, at 86, 101; GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 105; see Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
81. MASON, supra note 9, at 119. This was the beginning of the modern welfare
system.
82. Women's right to vote was secured via the nineteenth amendment to the
Constitution. See ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRuGGLE 319-337 (1975).
83. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 41, at 434-40; Herma H. Kay, Beyond No-Fault:
New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS (Stephen
D. Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990).
84. L. Wayne Scott, Liability of Parents for Conduct of Their Child Under Section
33.01 of the Texas Family Code: Defining the Requisite Standards of "Culpability," 20
ST. MARY'S L.J. 69, 72-73 (1988). These laws gained "new momentum" in the 1980s
because of growing concern about juvenile crime. S. Randall Humm, Criminalizing
Poor Parenting Skills as a Means to Contain Violence by and Against Children, 139
U. PA. L. REv. 1123, 1125-26 (1991).
85. 1 CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAwS § 26, at 102, 106-09 (1931).
86. MASON, supra note 9, at 124. See also infra notes 112-14 and accompanying
text.
87. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating Alabama statute au-
thorizing alimony awards only for wives); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981)
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custody disputes.88 Beginning in 1968, the United States Supreme
Court made a massive foray into family law, using the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to endow illegitimate children with most of the enti-
tlements of legitimate children from their parents.8 9 The Court
also expanded the constitutional rights of parents to privacy and
autonomy in making decisions about marriage, procreation, and
child-raisingo and expanded the group of parents so protected to
include the unmarried as well as the married.91 While all but four-
teen states and the District of Columbia92 have now renounced
common law marriage, an increasing number have granted "mar-
riage-like" rights to cohabitants with the same effect.93
11. Family Form and Function
The Christian ideal, on which American family law was
founded, chose a particular family form to perform desired func-
tions.94 The married heterosexual monogamous couple with sex-
based roles was thought to be the best arrangement for producing
and raising children. 95 Today in the United States, the ideal has
eroded and so has its model. This erosion is apparent in the law
which is now much more ambivalent about family form. The vi-
sions of marriage as an exclusive, special, protected status arising
on compliance with prescribed requirements96 and of divorce as a
carefully regulated privilege available only on limited prescribed
(invalidating Louisiana statute making husband head of the family). Approximately
one-third of the states have equal rights amendments. See Bruce E. Altschuler,
State ERAs and Employment Discrimination, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1267, 1267 n.6
(1992).
88. MASON, supra note 9, at 126.
89. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 960-965. See infra text at notes 104-08.
90. See cases cited infra notes 100-03, 144.
91. See cases cited infra notes 100-03.
92. ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 29. The common law marriage jurisdictions
are Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and the District of Co-
lumbia. Id.
93. The effect is to erode legal distinctions between the married and unmarried.
See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Evans v. Wall, 542 So. 2d 1055
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Sullivan v. Rooney, 533 N.E 2d 1372 (Mass. 1989); Pickens
v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872 (Miss. 1986); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1980); Goode v. Goode, 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990); Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d
303 (Wis. 1987). But fornication is still a crime in more than one-fourth of U.S. juris-
dictions, and adultery is still a crime in about half the states and the District of
Columbia. Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre-
and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1660, 1661, 1671-72 (1991) [hereinafter
Note, Constitutional Barriers].
94. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text
95. Id.
96. Id.
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grounds97 have all but vanished from the law. The spouses are le-
gally equal in marriage98 and, although only fifteen jurisdictions
now recognize common law marriage,99 legal distinctions between
the married and unmarried have faded. The unmarried now have
the same constitutional rights as the married to obtain contracep-
tives' 00 and abortions,' 0 and to participate in hearings on cus-
todyl02 and adoption103 of their children. Their children, though
illegitimate,304 have substantial entitlements, including rights to
death benefits,105 support,106 inheritance,107 and welfare.108 Vari-
ous forms of discrimination based on marital status are prohib-
itedl09 and state courts are "divorcing" the unmarried, dispensing
marital benefits as they do so.110 Legislatures have repealed, and
courts have invalidated, laws imposing criminal sanctions for sex-
ual conduct inimical to marriage."' Divorce is easy, 112 as it is a
purely consensual procedure in many jurisdictions.11 3 In other ju-
risdictions, even consent is unnecessary-divorce is available at the
97. Id.
98. Spousal equality is a result of equal protection doctrine and state equal
rights amendments. See supra note 87.
99. See supra note 92.
100. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
101. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
102. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
103. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); see also Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
104. This is no longer true in the eight states that have adopted the Uniform Par-
entage Act. The act eliminates the classification of illegitimacy and provides that
"[tihe parent and child relationship extends equally to every child and to every par-
ent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." UNri. PA rNTAGE AcT § 2, 9B
U.L.A. 296 (1987).
105. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
106. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
107. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977). But see Lali v. La3Ai, 439 U.S. 259
(1978).
108. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
109. Unmarried couples now are protected from discrimination on the basis of
their marital status in employment, housing, use of public accommodations, and
credit. See John C. Beattie, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal
For The Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 1415 (1991).
110. See supra note 93.
111. Even where criminal penalties are still imposed, enforcement is often lax.
See generally D. MAcNAMARA & E. SAGARIN, SEX, CRIME, AND THE LAw ix-xi, 186-88,
190-92 (1977). Typical of the current legal tolerance is the opinion of the Court of
Appeals of New York in People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1981). In invalidat-
ing the provision of the New York Penal Law that made consensual sodomy a crime,
the court held: "In sum, there has been no showing of any threat, either to partici-
pants or the public in general, in consequence of the voluntary engagement by adults
in private, discreet, sodomous conduct." 415 N.E.2d at 941; see also Note, Constitu-
tional Barriers, supra note 93.
112. See supra note 86.
113. See, e.g., CAL. FAImY CODE § 2400 (West 1994).
[Vol. 14:489
19961 RESPONSIBLE PARENTS AND GOOD CHILDREN 501
option of one spouse despite the other's objection.114 Far from being
favored by the law, the married are worse off than the unmarried in
some respects. For example, in cases of dissolving relationships,
the married are limited to the provisions of the state prescribed
marital regime while the unmarried may battle each other with all
the weapons of the common law.115 Income tax law imposes vari-
ous penalties on some married couples."i 6 Indeed, the Internal
Revenue Code, as a whole, is a paragon of ambivalence, providing a
great disincentive to marriage under some circumstances and a sig-
nificant incentive to marry under others."i 7 In light of this legal
ambivalence about family form, it is not surprising that the tradi-
tional two parent heterosexual married couple with a male bread-
winner, a female homemaker, and their children is now a vanishing
breed. More children are living with two married working parents,
with single mothers or fathers, in stepparent families, in unmarried
cohabiting heterosexual, and homosexual households, and in polyg-
amous families.1i8 Some blame these departures from the tradi-
tional family model for the instability of modern American families
and the attendant risks to their children."19
Whether the blame is well- or ill-founded is beside the point,
however. Whatever the reason or reasons, it seems clear that
American families now face an uncertain future.120 The need to
strengthen and stabilize them seems obvious and calls for a change
in legal perspective. Instead of favoring a particular family form, as
it used to do, or reflecting confusion, as it presently does, the law
114. This is "the inevitable consequence of abandoning the fault grounds .... This
result also recognizes that in American society today there is little or no likelihood
that the law can force married persons to live together when one of them is deter-
mined to end the marriage." 2 HoMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAw OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 41-42 (practitioners' 2d ed. 1987).
115. Such weapons include express or implied contracts, constructive or resulting
trusts, or quantum meruit. See supra note 93, in particular Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976), and Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980); Kozlowski
v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979).
116. David J. Roberts & Mark J. Sullivan, The Federal Income Tax: Where Are the
Family Values?, 57 TAX NoEs 547, 547 (1992).
117. Id.
118. Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Ap-
proach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991); see
also Dirk Johnson, Polygamists Emerge from Secrecy, Seeking Not Just Peace But
Respect, N.Y. Tmm, Apr. 9, 1991, at A22; Dirk Johnson, More and More, the Single
Parent Is Dad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1993, at Al.
119. The single parent family has been the subject of most criticism. See, e.g.,
Peter Steinfels, Seen, Heard, Even Worried About, N.Y. TmsEs, Dec. 27, 1992, § 4, at
1; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-37, 251; Michael Ingrassia, Endangered
Family, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1993, at 17; Barbara D. Whitehead, Dan Quayle Was
Right, ATLANTC MONTHLY, Apr. 1993, at 47. See generally Daniel P. Moynihan, De-
fining Deviancy Down, 62 Am. SCHOLAR 17 (1993).
120. See EDWARD SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN FAMILY 269-70 (1975).
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should embrace all families so long as they function well for their
children. Thus, the new ideal would become the "functioning fam-
ily." By "functioning family," I mean one that is good at caring for,
and nurturing, children. In such a family, the adults, of whatever
sex and number, and the children will have developed "strong, mu-
tual, irrational emotional attachments,121 the adults will be "com-
mitted to the [children's] well-being and development . . . for
life,"122 and the adults' personal satisfactions will be subordinate to
the children's welfare.
If the ideal functioning family is to become a reality, the law
will have to encourage and reward it. Unfortunately, current law
looks at the functioning family with ambivalence, sometimes de-
stroying it and sometimes supporting it. Two recent, much publi-
cized cases illustrate the law's destructive effect. They are the Baby
Jessica123 and Baby Richard124 cases, in which would-be adoptive
parents battled their biological counterparts. Both Jessica and
Richard were born to unmarried mothers,125 who gave them up for
adoption, forty hours,12 6 and four days,127 respectively, after their
births. One mother named the wrong man as father- 29 and he con-
sented to the adoption, though he was not biologically related to the
child.129 The other mother refused to identify a father though she
knew who he was, 130 and told the father that the child was dead.'31
The biological fathers entered the proceedings to assert parental
rights, thirty-two,132 and fifty-seven days, 133 respectively, after the
babies were born. In the Baby Jessica case, the adoption did not
take place;134 in the Baby Richard case, it did.135 In both cases, the
biological parents ultimately married each other 136 and fought, in
protracted proceedings, to regain their children who remained in
121. Urie Bronfenbrenner, What Do Families Do?, FAMELY AFFAIRS, Winter-
Spring 1991, at 2.
122. Id.
123. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
124. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995).
125. Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 652; Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 236.
126. 502 N.W.2d at 651 n.l.
127. 649 N.E.2d at 364.
128. 502 N.W.2d at 652.
129. Id.
130. 649 N.E.2d at 327.
131. Id.
132. 502 N.W.2d at 652.
133. 649 N.E.2d at 327.
134. 502 N.W.2d at 652-53.
135. 649 N.E.2d at 327.
136. Lucinda Franks, The War for Baby Clausen, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 22,
1993, at 56, 57; Adoptive Parents Hand Over Boy in 4-Year Custody Fight, N.Y.
TEmEs, May 1, 1995, at A13 [hereinafter Adoptive Parents].
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families with the would-be adopters for 2 1/2 years in Baby Jessica's
case1 3 7 and almost 4 years in Baby Richard's.138 Though neither
father showed much promise as a prospective parent,' 3 9 the courts
held that their conduct with respect to the babies was not suffi-
ciently remiss to cause them to forfeit parental rights. Accordingly,
each baby was ordered rerouted140 just like a misdirected package,
to its biological parents, destroying two functioning families to the
detriment of the children and the adults in them.
There are two rules of current law that compelled these harsh
results. They are (1) that in custody disputes between biological
parents and nonbiological parents, biological parents prevail unless
they are shown to be unfit or to have abandoned the child;141 and
(2) that parenthood is exclusive, that is, that the law recognizes
only one set of parents for a child at any one time and that recogni-
tion determines the child's placement. 142 The first rule, sometimes
called the "parental right doctrine,"'143 is based on a line of Supreme
Court cases in which the rights of biological parents with respect to
their children have been accorded constitutional status. 14 4 As the
137. Nancy Gibbs, In Whose Best Interest?, TIME, July 19, 1993, at 44, 47.
138. Adoptive Parents, supra note 136, at Cll.
139. Schmidt did not show much interest in Baby Jessica or in two other children
he fathered earlier. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
Kirchner was actually found to be unfit by one court. Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 327.
The testimony, according to a dissenting member of the Illinois Supreme Court, gave
some detail:
Indeed, the court knows nothing about the character of Kirchner, ex-
cept that which surfaced from testimony at the adoption hearing. Tes-
timony from various witnesses indicated that the biological mother of
the child had characterized Kirchner as being abusive, that she sought
and procured residence in a shelter for abused women; that he was a
gambler (Kirchner himself testified that he won $28,000 by gambling in
Atlantic City in September 1991); that he was too busy to get married
to the woman with whom he lived and impregnated, even though they
had procured two marriage licenses.
Id. at 343 (McMarrow, J., dissenting).
140. Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 198; Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 340.
141. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 823 (students' 2d ed. 1988).
142. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed,
70 VA. L. REv. 879, 883-93 (1984); Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian Mother
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO L. REv. 459, 468-473 (1990). See also
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) in which Justice Scalia stated,
"California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Compare
Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
allowed a child who had a presumed father to bring suit to establish another man as
her biological father.
143. CLARK, supra note 141, at 821.
144. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) ("Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska . . . we think it
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Supreme Court glowingly stated it in Prince v. Massachusetts: "It
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom in-
clude preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."145 As rigidly applied in the Baby Jessica and Baby Rich-
ard cases, the doctrine made the child's interests completely irrele-
vant. 14 6 Ironically, even in jurisdictions which adhered rigidly to
the parental right doctrine, unwed fathers did not come within the
scope of its protection before 1972. Thus, in many states, mothers,
acting alone, could give up unacknowledged illegitimate children
for adoption. 147 The law thus reflected the societal expectation that
an unwed father was not likely to assert his paternity but would
rather try to escape it. In 1972, the Supreme Court, in Stanley v.
Illinois,148 effectively brought unwed fathers within the protection
of the parental right doctrine. Stanley was an unwed father who
lived with his children and their mother. Under Illinois law the
mother was considered the sole parent and when she died the chil-
dren became wards of the state. Stanley, as an unwed father, was
not entitled to a hearing on his fitness to keep the children under
Illinois law. The Supreme Court held that this violated Stanley's
due process and equal protection rights. Of adoption, it said:
We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering unwed
fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness
appears to be minimal. If unwed fathers, in the main, do not
care about the disposition of their children, they will not appear
to demand hearings. If they do care, under the scheme here
held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at some later time have
to afford them a properly focused hearing in a custody or adop-
tion proceeding. 149
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of par-
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control."); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) ("First of all, constitutional interpretation has consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the
rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See infra note 145 and accompanying text. The doc-
trine may have "antedated" the cases basing it on the Constitution. See CLARK,
supra note 141, at 821 n.15 (citing Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 151 P.2d 999
(1944) and cases cited therein).
145. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
146. See Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption
Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1279, 1281-
85 (1994) [hereinafter Comment, The Struggle for the Child]; Comment, Rights of
Unwed Fathers and The Best Interests of The Child: Can These Competing Interests
be Harmonized? Illinois Putative Father Registry Provides an Answer, 26 Loy. U.
Cm. L.J. 703, 731 (1995).
147. See WADLINGTON, supra note 71, at 847.
148. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
149. Id. at 657 n.9.
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Accordingly, many states modified their adoption laws and thus fa-
thers like those in the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases ac-
quired rights to object and be heard.150
These tragic cases could, nevertheless, have been resolved
more happily were it not for a second governing legal rule-the doc-
trine of exclusive parenthood, that is, that a child can have only a
single set of parents. Thus, an award to biological parents in these
cases would automatically end the child's placement with the
nonbiological parents and an award to nonbiological parents would
have ended the biological parents' rights. In the absence of such a
rule, the Illinois and Michigan courts could have confirmed paren-
tal rights in the biological parents but left custody of the children
with their nonbiological parents in functioning families. Such a re-
sult would be possible under the new Uniform Adoption Act151
which, when a petition for adoption is denied, requires the court to
make an independent determination on custody using a standard
which reflects the welfare of the child. 152 In the words of the official
comment, the Act
does not treat a minor as an object that "belongs" to a parent or
would-be parent and has to be shifted back and forth in the
event "ownership" rights are changed or reinstated. The fact
that a birth parent's status as a legal parent may be restored or
recognized ... is not tantamount to a determination that the
minor must be placed in that parent's custody.15 3
Current law sometimes protects the functioning family. This
protection is apparent in the jurisdictions which soften the parental
right doctrine in custody disputes between nonbiological and biolog-
ical parents by inquiring about the best interests of, or detrimental
effect on, the child.154 Another widely publicized case aptly illus-
trates this. In Twigg v. Mays, 155 an intermediate appellate Florida
court held that changing the custody of a child from the man who
raised her to biological parents who, at her birth, mysteriously took
home the wrong baby, would be detrimental to the child.156 The
Twigg court, therefore, left her in the custody of the father who
raised her and terminated the biological parents' rights.157 Ironi-
cally, the child, after a tiff with her father and stepmother, went to
150. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 913.
151. 9 U.L.A. Ann. §§ 1-101 to 8-106 (Supp. 1995)
152. Id. §§ 2-408 (e)-(f), 2-409 (e)-(f), 3-704. In the custody determination the
court is to consider either the best interests of, or detrimental effect on, the child. Id.
153. Id. § 2-408 cmt.
154. See 2 CiAK, supra note 114, at 824.
155. No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).
156. Id. at *6.
157. Id.
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live with her biological parents15-a practical, though not legal,
acknowledgment of the utility of having more than one family.159
Similarly, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,160 an analogous, but not
identical, scenario, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion emphasized
the importance of the functioning family. At issue was a California
law denying a biological father the right to assert paternity of a
child born to a married woman and living in a fxnctioning family
with her mother and the mother's husband. In upholding the law,
Scalia said:
What counts is whether the States in fact award substantive
parental rights to the natural father of a child conceived within
and born into an extant marital union that wishes to embrace
the child. We are not aware of a single case, old or new, that
has done so. This is not the stuff of which fundamental rights
qualifying as liberty interests are made. 16 1
Justice Scalia's focus, in framing the issue in this opinion, is on the
family relationship which the biological father sought to disrupt.
As Justice Brennan pointed out in his dissent,162 this was not the
Court's focus in earlier cases on fathers' rights. In earlier cases, the
Court focused on the relationship which the biological father was
trying to preserve-his own relationship with the child-instead of
the relationship he was trying to disrupt-that of the child163 with
its functioning family. Unique though Justice Scalia's approach
may be in this line of fathers' rights cases, it is the correct one be-
cause it supports and rewards the functioning family in which the
child already lives.
The Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases seem especially
harsh in light of these more sensitive rulings but they teach us two
things: (1) adults can be very selfish164 and (2) the law which com-
pels such results needs drastic revision. The first and narrowest
possible remedy would take care of these cases by returning to pe-
158. William Booth, Tangled Family Ties and Children's Rights: Teen's Change of
Mind Revives Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 1944, at A3.
159. See Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on the American
Family, 76 MINN. L. REV. 891, 913 (1992); see also Pepper Schwartz, Children's New
Bonds: Para-Dads, Para-Moms, N.Y. TImEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at B1, B4 ("a growing
number of adults are coming to view children as a collective commitment that is
more than biological in its impulse").
160. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 127.
162. Id. at 142-43 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Lehr v.
Robertson, 436 U.S. 248 (1983)).
163. See supra notes 102-03.
164. Compare the Baby Pete case in which the biological father and the -ptive
parents reached a settlementC the adoptive parents kept physical custody; while the
biological father's name appeared on the birth certificate and he had visitation
rights. Comment, The Struggle for the Child, supra note 146, at 1285.
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1972165 law which, in effect, said to men: "If you want rights and
privileges vis-A-vis your offspring, make sure that you marry their
mother before you conceive them or before they are born." In the
Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases this rule would have thrown
the fathers out of court. This is not an unreasonable legal posi-
tion,166 but such a narrow approach would not help would-be adop-
tive parents in battles against biological mothers or in battles
against biological mothers and fathers who were married to each
other at the baby's conception or birth.
The second possible remedy would be to nullify the bad effects
of the parental right doctrine by separating the question of parental
rights from the question of custody and making the custody deter-
mination depend on a standard reflecting the child's interests.
That was the court's approach in the Twigg case without statutory
authorization,167 it is the approach of the new Uniform Adoption
Act, 168 and it is now mandated by statute in Illinois when an adop-
tion is denied or revoked on appeal. 16 9 Unfortunately, in the Twigg
case, the Court, to reach the right result, was compelled, by the ex-
clusive parenthood doctrine, to terminate the biological parents'
rights, a harsh and oppressive punishment.
The third possibility for revision would be to change the legal
framework for resolving disputes of this kind. Under present law,
when these cases arise, we ask two questions: (1) is either of the
contestants a biological parent? If the answer is "yes," as it was in
the Jessica and Richard cases, the next question is (2) has he or she
forfeited his or her rights to the child? If the answer to the second
question is "no," as it was in these cases, the game is up for the
nonbiological parents. We could easily change the questions, ask-
ing two others instead: (1) is the child in a family? If the answer is
"yes," the second question should be (2) is that family good for the
child, or in other words, is the family functioning well with respect
to the child? If the answer to this alternative second question is
"yes," then the child should stay where it is. If the child is not in a
family, or if it is in a family which is not functioning well with re-
spect to the child, then the law should try to find and place the child
in a good family that will function well with respect to it.
165. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
166. Some would argue that this deprives a child of a biological link which is an
essential to parenting. See, e.g., DAvID M. SCHNEIDER, AZMERIcAN KINsHIP: A CUL-
TuRAL AccoUNT 24, 25, 107 (1968). The importance of the biological tie is overstated.
See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAmvy BoNDs 163-86 (1993); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cm. L. Razv. 209, 211 (1995).
167. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
169. ILL. ComP. STAT. ANN. ch. 750, para. 50/20 (West Supp. 1996).
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Ideally, the law should move to a combination of the second
and third possibilities. That would mean that in a case like Twigg
v. Mays,170 a court would not have had to terminate the biological
parents' rights171 in order to leave the child with the man who
raised her from birth, and that in a case like Michael H. v. Gerald
D. 172 the biological father would not have to be denied all paternal
rights173 in order to leave the ehild in her functioning family.
m. The Economic Value of Children
The Michael H. v. Gerald D. 174 case illustrates the proposition
that children have value, at least to their parents. 175 Today in
America we value children as objects of emotional attachment.
They are to be loved, nurtured, educated, and amused but not eco-
nomically exploited. Yet, not very long ago, in colonial times, chil-
dren were frankly acknowledged as economic assets.176 They
worked and parents or masters controlled their wages and services
in exchange for maintaining and training them.177 The law en-
forced and supported the economic relationship. 17s
170. No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).
171. See supra notes 155-57. See also Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental
Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423 (1983).
172. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
173. As the plurality opinion stated it:
But if Michael were successful in being declared the father, other rights
would follow-most importantly, the right to be considered as the par-
ent who should have custody... a status which "embrace[s] the sum of
parental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including the
child's care; the right to the child's services and earnings; the right to
direct the child's activities; the right to make decisions regarding the
control, education, and health of the child; and the right, as well as the
duty,, to prTep r the child %r additio alw1,'nhich i- tulde the
teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citi-
zenship."... All parental rights, including visitation, were automati-
cally denied by denying Michael status as the father.
491 U.S. at 118-19 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
174. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
175. Indeed, Michael was still pursuing his parental rights three years after he
lost his case in the United States Supreme Court.
He continues to seek her out, flying all the way across the country to
wait at the eleven-year-old's school bus stop, hoping for a chance to tell
her who he is. He says, "She is really the only living attachment to me."
She says, "That's the crazy man from California who thinks he's my
father."
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching The Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARnozo L. REV. 1747, 1865 (1993) (citing Peter Marks, The
Quest of the Fathers, NEwSDAY (Nassau Cty. ed.), Apr. 1, 1992, § II, at 56).
176. See supra text accompanying note 50.
177. See supra text accompanying note 56.
178. See supra text accompanying note 59.
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During the nineteenth century, children continued to work in
mines and factories,179 "perhaps in greater numbers and in worse
conditions than before, but they... remained in the custody and
control of their own parents; their employer had only limited con-
trol over them at the workplace and no obligation for their wel-
fare."180 In the mid-nineteenth century, social reformers,
motivated by a desire to save "suffering children,"'18 and organized
labor, motivated by self interest to eliminate a child labor system
which depressed wage rates,1 8 2 joined together to secure the pas-
sage of protective labor legislation limiting the kinds and hours of
work children could do. 183 Compulsory education laws followed184
and, together, they helped reduce the number of children at
work.185 Only in the twentieth century did child-raising become
the subject of scientific inquiryS6 and childhood come to be looked
upon as the key to understanding adult behavior.187 We love, or
pretend to love,188 our children and downplay their economic value.
Yet they remain economically valuable commodities and current
law has not completely denuded them of this characteristic. Again,
the law is ambivalent. It increasingly recognizes children as per-
sons while it simultaneously treats them as consumer goods to be
enjoyed or discarded; it prohibits some kinds of economic exploita-
tion of children while permitting others. In addition to prohibiting
child labor' 8 9 and requiring children to go to school' 90 instead of
work while parents support them,191 the law prohibits "baby sell-
ing" in connection with adoptions 192 and surrogacy contracts. 19 3 In
apparent contradiction, the law allows a free market for in-vitro fer-
tilization19 4 and the sperm and ova needed to accomplish it. 195 The
179. FRUEDMAN, supra note 41, at 491.
180. MASON, supra note 9, at 78.
181. FREMAN, supra note 41, at 491.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 492.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. MASON, supra note 9, at 161.
187. GREENLEAF, supra note 4, at 124.
188. See Roger Rosenblatt, The Society That Pretends to Love Children, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 58.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 183.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 80, 184.
191. See supra text accompanying note 19.
192. Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993 at
43, 49. 'By statute or case law, all states decry baby selling, and most prohibit
finder's fees to agencies or other intermediaries." Id.
193. For summaries of existing legislation on this subject in the United States,
see ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 1326-28; Linda D. Elrod, Family Law in the
Fifty States, 28 FAm. L.Q. 573, 602-03 (1995).
194. BARTHOLET, supra note 166, at 209-12.
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law allows the use of children as bargaining chips by parents in
divorce negotiations;196 and it allows everyone to procreate197 with-
out inquiry into purpose. 198 Adoptions are supposed to be gratui-
tous transfers under the present regulatory scheme but, in fact,
economically valuable promises to support and care for children, as
well as money, pass from adoptive parents to placement agencies or
directly to biological parents. 199 The law, itself, provides for pay-
ment of subsidies to those who adopt hard-to-place special needs
children and also for payments to those who act as foster par-
ents.2 0 0 "[I]n virtually all states the adoption subsidy rate is signifi-
cantly lower than the foster care rate for the same child."201 This
differential transmits the erroneous message that temporary fami-
lies are better than permanent ones and "can be, and frequently is,
a serious disincentive to adoption ... *"202 Despite legal prohibi-
tions on selling children, 203 a black market in babies exists.20 4 The
gains from this market go mostly to doctors, lawyers, and other
middlemen who arrange the transactions, instead of to birth
mothers. 205
The differential between adoption subsidies and foster care
payments should be abolished and the law should freely acknowl-
edge the economic value of children. Adoption should be made eas-
195. Peggy Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 31; see, e.g., A Baby of Your Own Through Egg Donation,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1995, at A12 (advertisement); Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations
Meet a Need and Raise Ethical Questions, N.Y. Tims, Jan. 8, 1996, at Al, A7.
196. See, e.g., Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
197. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
198. For an example of procreation for the purpose of using the resulting child as
a tissue donor, see Patricia Brennan, A Mother Saves Her Child by Giving Birth to
Another, WASH. POST MAG., May 9, 1993, at 6.
199. Hollinger, supra note 192, at 49.
200. Irving Schulman & Richard E. Behrman, Overview and Major Recommenda-
tions, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 4, 8.
201. Id. See also Judith K McKenzie, Adoption of Children With Special Needs,
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 62, 73; MARY FORD & JOE KROLL, THERE Is A
BETTER WAY: FAMILY-BASED ALTERNATIVES To INSTITUTIONAL CARE 10-11 (1995) (re-
search brief for North American Council on Adoptable Children).
202. Schulman & Behrman, supra note 200, at 8; see also McKenzie, supra note
201, at 73.
203. See supra note 192 and accompanying text
204. See J. Robert S. Prichard, A Market for Babies, in FA~miy MATraS 56, 57
(Martha Minow ed., 1993); Elizabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Econom-
ics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STuD. 323, 337-42 (1978); see also Margaret V.
Turano, Black Market Adoptions, 22 CATH. LAw. 48 (1976); Jorge L. Carro, Regula-
tion of Intercountry Adoption: Can the Abuses Come to an End?, 18 HASTINGS INT'L &
Comp. L. REv. 121, 124 (1994); Comment, Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of
Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference Convention in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 623 (1994).
205. Prichard, supra note 204, at 57.
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ier 2 06 and surrogacy should be permitted. I am suggesting the
enactment of permissive regulation of the kind imposed on lawyers
and doctors. Producing babies for others should be done, like the
practice of law and medicine, by a cadre of professionals,207 care-
fully chosen, trained, and licensed. Professionals work for money,
of course, but often donate their services free of charge in appropri-
ate cases.
IV. Parents' Responsibility for Antisocial Acts of Their
Children
People want to be parents and the law encourages them to do
so by making procreation a fundamental constitutional right.20
Few who embark on the adventure of parenthood carefully consider
the legal (or other) responsibilities involved. Colonial law made
clear that the head of the colonial household was expected to control
the children within it.209 If he did not, the community stepped in
and took over.2 10 In the ensuing 200 years, a series of Supreme
Court cases2 1 1 has wrapped the American family in a constitutional
shroud of autonomy and privacy. The family now stands isolated
from the community in trying to control its children and in perform-
ing its other tasks. This constitutional protection has caused the
states, traditional arbiters of family matters, to virtually abandon
the field, leaving parents to flounder alone.212 States cannot formu-
late public policies to prefer the functioning family, enforce familial
obligations, demand family responsibility, protect family rights, or
enforce family identity without running afoul of the Constitution.
There remain on the books, however, a potpourri of parental re-
sponsibility laws which have withstood constitutional chal-
206. BARTHOLET, supra note 166, at 231 ("We need to deregulate adoption.").
207. This is not a job for amateurs. See Judith T. Younger, What the Baby M Case
is Really About, 6 LAw & INEQ. J. 75, 80 (1988); see also Susan Ince, Inside the
Surrogate Industry, FAImY MArr Rs, supra note 204, at 104; Arthur Serratelli,
Surrogate Motherhood Contracts: Should the British or Canadian Model Fill the
U.S. Legislative Vacuum?, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L & ECON. 633, 672-73 (1993).
208. See cases cited supra note 197.
209. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
211. See cases cited supra note 144.
212. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L.
REv. 255, 268 (1973) ("The state, it is concluded, must leave the field; each person is
to be free to make his or her own sexual style as he or she is free to make his or her
own religion."); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, THE FAMIey: PRESERVING AmRICA'S FU-
TulE 16-17 (1986) ("[T]hese.. . decisions... have crippled the potential of public
policy to enforce familial obligations, demand family responsibility, protect family
rights, or enhance family identity.").
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lenge213-state statutes which impose token liability on parents for
the torts and crimes of their children.214 Some of them focus on
parents' behavior-for example, the statutes penalizing parents for
contributing to the delinquency of minors. 2 15 Others focus on chil-
dren's behavior, imposing vicarious liability on parents for their
children's acts-for example, the Louisiana law making parents lia-
ble to a third person for damage caused by their minor children216
and the California law subjecting parents to criminal prosecution
for failing "to exercise reasonable care, supervision, protection, and
control" over minors.2 17 The stated purposes of these laws is to
compensate victims of personal or property injury, 2 1s to make par-
ents more careful in supervising their children,219 and to curb juve-
nile delinquency.220 The statutes are all very limited in scope,
however. The California "failure to control" law provides for a max-
imum fine of $2,500 and/or imprisonment for up to a year.2 2 1 The
Minnesota malicious injury law provides for a maximum liability
for injury to person or property of $1,000 and that, in turn, is lim-
ited to special damages only, like medical expenses, lost wages and
other damages for unusual effects of the injury.2 2 2 The ambivalent
message from these laws to parents is, "You are responsible for your
children's transgressions but not very!" and the assumptions that
underlie the law are questionable.
Parents are, of course, initiators of the family enterprise. It is
convenient to assume that they have a degree of control over its
minor members, and it is easy to blame parents for the delinquen-
cies of the children they produce. Experts and nonexperts do so.
For example, from the Uniform Crime Reports comes this state-
ment: "Many social scientists believe that much of the violence re-
213. See, e.g., Williams v. Garcetti, 853 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1993); see also Note, Consti-
tutional Limitations On State Power To Hold Parents Criminally Liable For The De-
linquent Acts of Their Children, 44 VAND. L. REv. 441 (1991) [hereinafter Note,
Constitutional Limitations].
214. See Toni Weinstein, Visiting the Sins of the Child on the Parent: The Legality
of Criminal Parental Liability Statutes, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 859 (1991); S. Randall
Humm, supra note 84; L. Wayne Scott, supra note 84; Ellenmarie Shong, The Legal
Responsibility of Parents for Their Children's Delinquency, 6 FAm. L.Q. 145 (1972).
215. See Note, Constitutional Limitations, supra note 213, at 447.
216. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 2318 (West 1979 & Supp. 1996).
217. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
218. Weinstein, supra note 214, at 863-64.
219. Id. at 864.
220. For example, the California legislature, in enacting its law, found that "Cali-
fornia is in a state of crisis which has been caused by violent street gangs whose
members threaten, terrorize, and commit a multitude of crimes against the peaceful
citizens of their neighborhoods." CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1988 & Supp.
1990).
221. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272.
222. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 540.18 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
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flects a breakdown of families.... Some studies suggest that 70
percent of juvenile offenders come from single parent homes."223
And from Vogue magazine comes this one:
It's about bailing [out] on the kids... Family values are what
keep the button off self-destruct. Just look at the seventies me-
dia, look at Ms. magazine or Playboy. The media told people,
"Go ahead, do what you want. Bail [out] on your relationships
and fuck the kids." So people did, and so now their kids are
shooting them in the street, and there's a kind of poetic justice
in that.22 4
But is the blame justified? Do parents really have the ability to
control their children? There are at least two other factors that
have the capacity to override parental efforts in this regard: genes
and societal attitudes.
Most of us believe, before we have children, that we will be
able to mold the personalities of our offspring by teaching and train-
ing and a mellifluous home environment. In other words, that nur-
ture, rather than nature, is the predominant factor in determining
personality. We discover the truth after our children are born.
They arrive with personalities, which turn out to be quite different
from each other, and quite different in some ways from those we
may have liked to instill in them. Nature does not wait for nurture
to operate. Nature makes the children, from their conception, very
much what they are. Recent studies seem to bear this out. Genetic
endowment, not environment, accounts for much of our children's
personalities.225 As one expert puts it: "Study after study has
shown that the interfamilial variance in personality is about the
same as the intrafamilial variance-once you control for genes....
Childhood events-even childhood trauma-and childrearing ap-
pear to have only weak effects on adult life."226 In light of this revi-
sion of long-standing tenets, it may be unreasonable to hold parents
responsible for their children's personalities and resulting behavior.
Assuming for the purpose of argument that parents can affect these
things, a second overriding factor is that package of views prevail-
ing in a given society at a given time. These societal attitudes can
ruin a child with the best genes brought up by the best parents.
223. F.B.I., supra note 15, at 279.
224. Marina Rust, Split Decision, VoGUE, Feb. 1994, at 66.
225. Auke Tellegen et al., Personality Similarity in Twins Reared Apart and To-
gether, 54 J. PERsoNArrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1031 (1988); Thomas J. Bouchard, Jr. et
al., Sources of Human Psychological Differences: The Minnesota Study of Twins
Reared Apart, 250 SCIENCE 223 (1990).
226. MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, WHAT YOU CAN CHANGE & WHAT You CAN'T 236-37
(1994).
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The first question we have to ask ourselves is, "Does this soci-
ety really want good children?"227 That is certainly the general as-
sumption and few individuals would say "no" if asked. I think,
however, that few of us really view good children as a primary goal.
We would rather have brilliant students, good athletes, and ulti-
mately successful professionals. We are not that interested in good
people. We do not reward decency or kindness or compassion but
rather good grades, making the football team, and getting into med-
ical or law school. As one outstanding child psychologist puts it:
In the United States, it is now possible for a person 18 years of
age to graduate from high school, college, or university without
ever having cared for, or even held, a baby; without ever having
looked after someone who was old, ill, or lonely; or without ever
having comforted or assisted another human being who really
needed help. No society can long sustain itself unless its mem-
bers have learned the sensitivities, motivations and skills in-
volved in assisting and caring for other human beings. For
some years I have been advocating the introduction in our
schools, from the earliest grades onward, of what I have called a
curriculum for caring. The purpose would be not to learn about
caring but to engage in it: children would be asked to take re-
sponsibility for spending time with and caring for others-old
people, younger children, the sick and the lonely.228
Taking it down a notch to young people themselves, we know that
they want most of all to be popular. We encourage them in that
goal; we want them to be popular too.229 Unfortunately, in our soci-
ety, there is very little connection between youthful popularity and
decency. The most "popular" kid is the "coolest," most athletic, or
most beautiful, and not necessarily the decentest, tenderest, or
most compassionate.2 30 Furthermore, as a society, we are anxious
to be off the moral hook. As one commentator recently put it, the
old value system "which recognized real differences between good
and evil, that there are good and bad actions, good or bad societies,
good or bad people" 23 1 is under attack. In the family context, this
227. Dennis Prager, Do We Really Want Good Children?, ULTImATE ISSUES, Jan.-
Mar. 1988, at 16. I am indebted to Mr. Prager for the discussion of nonlegal societal
attitudes. The ideas are his. I agree with him. See also Roger Rosenblatt, Teaching
Johnny To Be Good, N.Y. Tms, Apr. 30, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 36.
228. Brian Hall, Families and Children First, CORNELL MAG., Nov. 1995, at 35, 38
(quoting Urie Bronfenbrenner); see also URM BRONFENBRENNER, THE ECOLOGY OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 53-54 (1979).
229. See, e.g., Maja Radevich, '90s Family Struggling with Parents, Pressure, L.A.
Tias, May 31, 1995, at E3.
230. See, e.g., Mary Jo Kochakian, Middle School Popularity May Pose Some
Risks, HARTFORD CouRAN r, Sept. 27, 1994, at El.
231. Dennis Prager, The War Against Differences, ULTnMATE IssuEs, Summer
1985, at 5; see also Kay Miller, Me vs. Morality, STAR Tam. (Minneapolis), June 5,
1995, at El.
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system shows up as a parental belief that parents bear no responsi-
bility for the misconduct or failures of their children. Parents do
not discipline children; they treat them as equals. Children call
adults by their first names. Adults do not tell children what to do;
they talk to children as pals, as if they, adults, had as much to learn
from children as children do from adults.232 In sum, as Lucinda
Franks put it, in a recent piece in the New York Times Magazine,
adults treat children as "little big people,"233 instead of giving them
the kind of parental attention they need-setting limits, being in
authority, maintaining a proper distance-in short, treating chil-
dren as children. When behavorial problems erupt,234 parents com-
pound the damage by taking children to psychiatrists and other
health professionals who reinforce parental belief that parents are
not responsible for the children in their charge or for improving
their lives. 23 5 The professionals diagnose the children as having
mental disorders and prescribe drugs to control their behavior.236
Prescribing medication is unnecessary and damaging to the chil-
dren so treated.237 The other side of this coin is that many adults
behave like children, by dressing like them, playing with toys, and
shirking responsibilities, 238 and we condone it.239
The same lack of moral judgment is reflected in our laws. As a
society, we have entrusted the whole task of child-raising to par-
ents. But we give them very little help in performing the task,
though they desperately need and would probably welcome it.240
Certainly, punishing parents with token liability for the sins of
their children makes little sense. Parents are failing at a job which
232. Prager, supra note 231, at 5.
233. Lucinda Franks, Little Big People, N.Y. TwEs, Oct. 10, 1993, § 6 (Magazine),
at 28.
234. See Franks, supra note 233, at 28; Bruce Weber, It's Not Fun to be the Boss of
Your Parents, N.Y. TIsES, Oct. 8, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 82.
235. See Peter R. Breggin, Symposium: Are Behavior-Modifying Drugs Over-
prescribed for America's School Children?, INSIGHT, Aug. 14, 1995, at 18; PETER R.
BREGGiN, Toxic PSYcHIATRY 269-92 (1991); Barbara Crosette, Agency Sees Risk in
Drug to Temper Child Behavior, N.Y. TnwEs, Feb. 29, 1996, at A7.
236. See Breggin, supra note 235, at 18; BREGGIN, supra note 235, at 269-92;
Crosette, supra note 235, at A7.
237. See Breggin, supra note 235, at 18; BREGGiN, supra note 235 at 269-92;
Crosette, supra note 235, at A7.
238. Prager, supra note 231, at 7-8.
239. Indeed, we've elected a President who is not the usual father figure but who,
in the words of one commentator, is a "gifted adolescent," the first of his kind. Mau-
reen Dowd, On Washington, We Are The President, N.Y. TnEs, Jan. 23, 1994, § 6
(Magazine), at 18. Ms. Dowd is referring to President Clinton. Her main point is
that the one thing "lwle can now say about the Clinton Administration" is that
"[there's never going to be any certainty." Id.
240. See Ronald Smothers, Tell It to Morn, Dad and the Authorities, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 14, 1993, § 4, at 4.
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no one has told them how to perform and which is too big for one or
two people acting alone. The law should help parents to be respon-
sible and children to be good: these are the behaviors that society
should expect. To help members of society to behave in these ways,
the law should set up standards for parenting and limits for chil-
dren. The standards for parenting should take the form of incen-
tives and rewards for functioning families. The limits for children
should include municipal curfews;241 tickets for truancy;2 42 con-
trolled fare on television; 243 and educational programs which teach
children to say "no" to premarital sex, 24 4 in addition to those which
hand out condoms, as if children were responsible adults with
enough sense to use them.245 We should be emphasizing de-
cency 246 over skill on the football field, and improving pre-school247
and school systems so parents would not need to add these func-
tions to their already difficult tasks.
V. The Primacy of Childrens' Interests in Deciding
Matters That Affect Them
Even with standards for parents and limits for children, the
law will need a basis for determining disputes that affect child wel-
fare. The best interests of the child standard248 which now comes
into play in custody, adoption, and visitation cases, is theoretically
sound. It carries the right message, which is that the child's inter-
ests should be paramount in deciding. Here again, the law is am-
bivalent. While giving lip service to the best interests standard,
courts frequently allow it to be diluted by other considerations that
reflect the interests of one or both parents or the state. The first
diluting factor in applying the best interests standard is gender
bias. Gender bias begins with the preeminence of the father in colo-
nial days as the head of the family and the custodian of the chil-
241. Id.
242. Verne G. Kopytoff, Where Truancy is Punished by Law, N. Y. Tmms, May 10,
1995, at Bll.
243. Congress has recently voted to require all new television sets to have V-chips
("V" stands for violence). Elizabeth Kolbert, Americans Despair of Popular Culture,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 20, 1995, § 2, at 1, 23. These would enable parents to block out
objectionable shows. Id.
244. See Jane Gross, Sex Educators for Young See New Virtue in Chastity, N.Y.
TImEs, Jan. 16, 1994, at Al.
245. See Elmer DeWitt, Making the Case for Abstinence, TIME, May 24, 1993, at
64. See also Nancy Gibbs, How Should We Teach Our Children About Sex?, TIEm,
May 24, 1993, at 60.
246. See BRONF N RENNKR, supra note 228.
247. See Steve Greenhouse, If The French Do It, Why Can't We?, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov.
14, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 59 (on the French system of day-care).
248. See supra text accompanying notes 61, 152-53.
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dren.249 Fathers' rights gave way to the tender years doctrine, a
strong preference for mothers as custodians of young children.250
The tender years doctrine gave way, in turn, in the wake of equal
protection doctrine and state equal rights amendments,251 to two
facially neutral rules of thumb which, nevertheless, operate to favor
one sex over the other. The two rules are the preference for joint
custody and the primary caretaker presumption. Joint custody is
an appealing doctrine; it enables courts to avoid difficult choices, as
well as the appearance of discrimination.252 However, it unfairly
rewards fathers who, during the marriage, were not the primary
caretakers of the children and gives them leverage at divorce to
wring concessions from their wives.2 53 The primary caretaker pre-
sumption favors mothers over fathers because most primary care-
takers of young children are women. In fact, mothers get custody in
ninety percent of all cases.254
Other parental rights can be diluting factors in the application
of the best interests standard. They are rights to relocate, First
Amendment rights, rights to privacy and free association, and
rights to divorce. Whenever a court allows the custodial parent to
move to a new community with the child, leaving the other parent
behind,255 the best interests standard is subordinated to the custo-
dial parent's right to relocate. The child then has to face not only
the breakup of the family into two households but a break in the
contact with one of its parents.
Parental First Amendment rights can similarly override the
child's interests. The courts curtail inquiry on the subject of par-
ents' religious beliefs and practices or lack of them2 56 though they
may affect the child. Similarly, parental rights to free association
249. See supra text accompanying note 41.
250. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 19, at 502.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 577-81.
253. See generally Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Cus-
tody, 47 MD. L. REv. 497 (1988).
254. See ELimm ET AL., supra note 19, at 508-09.
255. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich, 516 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 1987) (allowing a
mother to move from New York to California where her husband resided); Blumen-
thal v. Klimberg, 15 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 1146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 1988) (holding
that a mere intent to remarry an out-of-state resident sufficient as an "exceptional
circumstance"); see also Tropea v. Tropea, Nos. 1, 2, 64 WL 137476 (N.Y. Mar. 26,
1996) (holding that presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew the anal-
ysis of these cases in favor of one outcome or the other should be rejected but peti-
tioners' requests to move upheld); Russenberger v. Russenberger, 669 So. 2d 1044
(Fla. 1996) (holding that demonstration of good faith by custodial parent seeking to
relocate gives rise to a presumption in favor of the request to relocate).
256. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1048 (1978).
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and privacy may limit the best interests inquiry into parents' sex-
ual practices and morality. 25 7 The parental privacy right has been
held to invalidate a grandparents' visitation statute based on the
best interests of the child.258 The court held that the child's mar-
ried, fit parents were the sole arbiters of the child's best interests in
this regard.259
Perhaps the most telling example of parental interests being
allowed to override the child's interests is the complete absence of
any best interests inquiry260 on the vital question of family
breakup. Parents are permitted to divorce without regard to how
the divorce will affect the children or any investigation of alterna-
257. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Thompson, 449 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. 1983); Hansen v.
Hansen, 562 A.2d 1051 (Vt. 1989).
258. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
259. Id.
260. Divorce reformers earlier considered and rejected the idea of making child
welfare a factor-but they were working in the sixties, before the dramatic changes
in family structure occurred. As the Archbishop of Canterbury's group explairied
We need hardly say that the interests of any children of a marriage
alleged to have broken down have been much in our minds. It has
sometimes been suggested that divorce should not be available for any
cause to spouses With children still of school age. We cannot think it
just, however, that there should be one law of divorce for those with
children and another for those without. If there were, it is by no means
inconceivable that, at any rate in some marriages, childbearing might
be inhibited by desire for divorce or precipitated by a wish to avoid it.
But, that possibility apart, there exists no significant evidence to show
which is the worse for children, to live with parents who are at odds
with each other, or to be given into the charge of one parent after di-
vorce. We certainly have no reason to believe that it would invariably
be to the benefit of children to live with parents who had been refused a
divorce on their account.
ROBERT EXON ET AL., PurrING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORY SOCIETY
40 (1966). As Professor Levy's analysis for the Uniform Commissioners on Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Legislation explained:
When the issue is whether to impose an absolute ban [on divorce for
couples with minor children] or to take account of the father's present
and likely future financial circumstances, there is no basis for differen-
tiating children from wives-it is not sound to deny a divorce to a fa-
ther with several children simply because his income is marginal. It
would make more sense to try to insure that he did not renarry after
the divorce-although that course also has obvious risks. The most ap-
propriate course is to design child support enforcement doctrines which
are fair, flexible and expeditious.
ROBERT J. LEVY, UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELuINARY
ANALYSIS 110 (1968) (documeat prepared for the Special Committee on Divorce of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act does provide that a divorcing court may set aside a portion
of the parents' joint or separate estates in a separate fund "for the support, mainte-
nance, education, and general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent chil-
dren." UNi. MARRIAG. AND DIVORCE ACT § 307(b) (Alternative A), 9A U.L.A. 239
(1973).
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tive solutions26l designed for the children's protection. The best in-
terests of the child standard does appear belatedly in divorce
actions after the family is already broken, and then only in the rela-
tively small number of disputed custody cases. In those cases that
are settled, courts merely rubber-stamp parents' custodial
arrangements. 262
Still another diluting factor in applying the best interests
standard is the state's interest in achieving racial equality. Race is
a factor which may be considered in adoption and foster care place-
ments. Indeed, racial matching263 of children to prospective par-
ents is permitted and widely practiced even though it holds up the
child's placement. For Native American children, Congress created
a statutory preference for placement in Indian homes, overruling
otherwise applicable state law and jurisdiction in favor of tribal law
and courts.264 Custody disputes between divorcing couples, how-
ever, are governed by a different rule. Here, race may not be con-
sidered even though it bears on the child's best interests. The
state's interest in preserving racial equality has been held to over-
ride the child's welfare. The United States Supreme Court, in Pal-
more v. Sidoti,265 conceding that living with a step-parent of a
different race might subject the child to pressures and stresses it
would not otherwise face, nevertheless held that this could not be
considered. 266
The law should be changed to require an independent judg-
ment about the child's best interests before parents divorce even in
settled cases. The best interests standard should not be diluted by
considerations that reflect parents' or state interests.
261. Some commentators have suggested limitations on divorce during children's
minority. See, e.g., Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and
Demoralization, Together with Criticism and Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 45, 90 (1981) (proposing the marriage for minor children); DEBRA FRIEDMAN,
TOWARDS A STRUCTURE OF INDIFFERENCE 133-35 (1995) (discussing a child-centric
alternative).
262. At least the court does not become deeply involved in undisputed cases. See
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Korhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 954-56 (1979), and sources cited therein.
263. See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't. of Family & Children's Serv.,
563 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1977); In re R.M.G., 454 A.2d 776 (D.C. 1982); see also
Steven A. Holmes, Bitter Racial Dispute Rages Over Adoption, N.Y. Tims, Apr. 13,
1995, at A8.
264. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified
in large part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1983)).
265. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1948).
266. Id.
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VI. Conclusion
America's children are at risk because of their parents' failure
to form strong, stable families. The law is society's instrument for
communicating societal expectations to society members. American
family law, therefore, is the vehicle that should tell American par-
ents that strong, stable families, responsible parents, and good chil-
dren are what society expects. Currently, American family law
fails to accomplish this important task because it is ambivalent on
important family matters such as family form and function, the eco-
nomic value of children, parental responsibility for the antisocial
acts of their children, and the primacy of the children's interests in
deciding matters that affect their welfare. Current law thus bears
some responsibility for the failures of American families and the
concomitant risks to their children. The law should be reformed so
that it clearly articulates societal expectations. Specifically, the re-
forms should include encouragements and rewards for functioning
families, regardless of form or biological connections; acknowledg-
ment of the economic value of children and facilitation of adoptions
and surrogate parenthood, subject to professional regulation; repeal
of existing parental responsibility laws and their replacement with
standards for parents and limits for children; and elevation of the
best interests of the child standard in matters that affect children's
welfare to primacy over parental and state interests.
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